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FOREWORD
FOR MUCH OF this century, decreasing electric prices' relegated the subject of regulation of electric utilities to the backwater of academic and trade journals. Since the mid-1960's,
however, a combination of factors has increased costs and consumer prices dramatically, and the serenity the industry enjoyed
in past years is now a memory. The technological innovations of
modem boiler technology and the economies of scale gained
through interconnection and coordination have been gradually
exhausted, while rising fuel and interest costs have led to higher
"nominal unit electricity costs." 2 Increases in the costs of construction, of meeting environmental concerns, and of plant site restrictions, have caused the marginal cost of new units to outstrip
even the inflation rate.' The resulting price increases to consumers have led to intense scrutiny of the electric utility industry. In
particular, the visibility of the respective states' Public Utility
Commissions (PUC's) and their regulatory policies has dramatically increased. Debate over high sulfur coal, acid rain, fuel adjustment clauses, peak load pricing, and elected versus appointed
commissions now occupies the public media as well as scholarly
4
writing.
The papers presented in this symposium concern important in1."From roughly 1917-1950 costs of producing electricity actually fell due to technological innovations and the growth of demand for electricity which allowed economies of
scale to be obtained, lowering per unit costs," while in the period 1948-68, prices rose only
five percent. Schiffel, Electirc Utility Regulation:An Overview of FuelAdjustment Clauses,
95 PUB. UTH.. FORT. 23, 24 (June 19, 1975).
2. Joskow, Public Utility Regulatory Reform Act of 1978: Electric Utility RateReform,

19 NAT. REs. J. 787, 791-92 (1979).
3. Id. at 792.
4. See, e.g., the recent discussion of acid rain in one of the major Cleveland newspapers, Acid Rain isCalled Serious Hazardto Crops and Water, The Plain Dealer, Apr. 19,

1980, § A, at 14, col 1.
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dividual threads in the whole cloth of electric utility regulation.
Although this foreward obviously cannot undertake to define how
each article fits into the entire framework of regulation, it is possible to identify some of the major issues in electric utility regulation today in the hope of delineating the terrain in which the
specific articles should be placed.
The key problem facing the electric utility industry is that of
rapidly increasing costs, passed on in prices, which in turn become
the focus of increasing consumer resentment and political action.
As noted very recently by a stock analyst, the utilities' costs "are
out of control and more and more money is being used to buy
smaller usable capacity. . . . A lot of people don't like utilities
and don't fully understand their problems. . . . They think the
utilities are getting rich when they are having trouble staying
afloat."5 This consumer resentment and the resulting political
pressures are generating a new regulatory climate in which the
long-run prospects for private utility ownership may be
threatened.
Most disturbing, perhaps, is that electric utilities have little
control over the major sources of these rising costs. Consider, for
example, the high costs necessarily attached to the nation's increasing reliance on coal and nuclear power. Fossil fuels give rise
to serious emissions problems, and the environmental legislation
designed to control air quality also results in greatly increased
costs. Especially as to coal-burning power plants built after 1970,
the increased costs of environmental compliance are being internalized and passed on to consumers. 6 Still to be fully accounted
for and absorbed are the costs associated with the phenomenon of
acid rain. The Environmental Protection Agency reports that fossil fuel plants, primarily burning coal, annually discharge approximately 50 million metric tons of sulfur and nitrogen oxides into
the air. The chemical composition of the atmosphere transforms
these oxides into sulfuric acid' which may fall-and has
5. Lawless, CEI's Money Problems Mirroredby Industry, Stock Analysts Say, The
Plain Dealer, Apr. 4, 1980, § A, at 1, col.1.
6. See generally 1 A.KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 69 (1970). It is estimated that fifteen percent of new plant construction costs go
for antipollution equipment. Dodosh, Electric Utilities, Hit by Cost of Money, Rate
Increase Delays, See Lackluster Year, Wall St. J., Mar. 22, 1979, at 40, col. 1.
7. EPA Research Summary, AcidRain, EPA-600/8-79-028 (Oct. 1979).
8. See Likens, Wright, Galloway & Butler, Acid Rain, 241 Sm. AM. 43, 45-46 (Oct1979); Mendelsolm & Orcutt, An EmpfiricalAnaysisofAir Pollution Dose-Response Curves,
6 J. OF ENVr'L ECON. AND MGT. 85 (1979).
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fallen--to earth far from its point of origin in the form of acid rain
or snow, and which appears to be extremely harmful to human
health and wildlife.9 It seems likely that as the dangers of acid
rain are further defined, there will follow significant new abatement measures and accompanying compliance costs.' 0
The potential for increasing costs for nuclear power generation
is even more striking. Nuclear plant construction delays and design changes triggered by the accident at Three Mile Island in the
spring of 1979 will have an important impact on the utilities' capital spending throughout the 1980's. One commentator has broken
down the effects of the Three Mile Island accident into five areas:
1) Increases in the [allowances for funds issued during construction] of a nuclear unit ... as a result of delays.
2) Design changes required by the NRC.
3) Increases in building costs stemming from the impact of
inflation on a lengthened construction timetable.
4) Acceleration of construction schedules of non-nuclear units
to ensure adequate reserve margins in the face of delays in
the completion of nuclear units.
5) Cancellation of nuclear units now scheduled for operation
in the late 1980's and early 1990's.1"
This list does not include the higher cost of acquiring capital
being incurred by all utilities using nuclear power in response to
the uncertainties introduced by Three Mile Island.12 Even without this cost, the accident at Three Mile Island may produce increases in utility capital spending of $10 to 12 billion, mainly for
engineering, safety, and general construction delays, compounded
by inflation, over the next five years.' 3 Yet a spectre even more
dismal than rapidly rising costs exists. If the public and political
reaction to Three Mile Island results in abandonment of the nuclear option, including breeder development, one industry predic9. Likens, Wright, Galloway & Butler, supra note 8, at 45-46, 49; G. Wetstone, Air
Pollution Control Laws in North America and the Problem of Acid Rain, 10 ELR 50001,
50001-02 (1980).
10. EPA to MoveAGainstAcid Rain in 1980, But Will Face Legal,Scientific Problems,
Wall St. J., Apr. 10, 1980, at 2, col. 1.
11. Studness, Utiliy CapitalSpending in theAftermath of Three Mile Island, 105 PuB.
UTIL. FORT. 36 (Mar. 13, 1980).
12. Metz, Past-Accident Costs May be Biggest HurdleforNuclearExpansion, Wall St.
J., Apr. 24, 1979, at 1, col. 5. One utility had to accept a fifty percent higher interest fee on
a construction bond only one week after Three Mile Island. As the article's title suggests,
"electricity [produced by nuclear power] threatens to become so expensive-more than
tripling in price over the next decade.. .- that some critics believe cost, not safety, is the
major hurdle facing the nuclear-power industry." Id.
13. Studness, supra note 11, at 36-37.
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tion is that there will be a potential serious electricity supply
shortfall sometime after the year 2000.14
Another source of public ire has been the automatic fuel adjustment clause. The first automatic fuel adjustment clauses appeared in 1917, and by the mid-1920's they had become a widely
accepted method of utility ratemaking.' 5 These clauses were necessitated by the enormous fluctuations in utilities' fuel prices, due
mainly to coal strikes and transportation difficulties. Without automatic fuel adjustments in utility rates, there would have been
16
too many rate cases for the regulatory bureaucracy to handle.
Although most states have utilized automatic adjustment
clauses,17 it was not until the fuel cost explosion from the Arab oil
boycott in the fall of 197318 that they experienced much public
scrutiny. Professor Leaffer's article cogently explores the legal
and economic issues connected with automatic adjustment
clauses.
The upward cost spiral and its painful manifestation in automatic fuel adjustment clauses have stimulated interest in electric
utility rate reform. Some analysts have focused on the application
of economic principles to the process of ratemaking. Given the
staggering cost of new plants, estimated, for example, to be $1,700
per kilowatt for nuclear units scheduled for completion in 1990 or
1991,1 9 and given the projected impact of new plants on the environment, peak load pricing based on marginal cost pricing principles has seemed to some to offer a means of reducing the need for
more generating facilities.2" Such methods of setting rates, how14. Id. at 38, quoting William McCollam, Jr., President of the Edison Electric Institute.
15. Trigg, EscalatorClauses in Public Utility Rate Schedules, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 964
(1958).
16. Welch, Pages with the Editor,96 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 6, 8 (Dec. 18, 1975).
17. Carver, Developments in Regulation: Adjustment Clauses, 53 DEN. L.J. 663, 663
(1976).
18. To illustrate the fuel cost explosion, consider that between July 1973 and July
1974, the average price of all fuel purchased in the South Atlantic region rose 123%. Utility
coal prices in the same period rose 172% for thermally equivalent coal, and Appalachian
Power raised consumer prices 86%. Schiffel, supra note I, at 24.
19. Studness, supra note 11, at 36.
20. Both the theory and application of peak load pricing are still evolving, but the
basic economic principle is simple. Alfred Kahn points out that "if the same type of capacity serves all users, capacity costs as such should be levied only on utilization at system
peak." I A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 89-103 (emphasis in original). This is nothing more
than a recognition that since utilities must carry capacity capable of meeting peak demand,
the marginal opportunity cost of an additional unit of consumption at peak is very high,
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ever, will not produce lower rates for ordinary households.2 '
A rate reform which is preferred by consumer groups is the
utilization of cross-subsidization of rates among customers to
achieve income redistribution goals. These so-called "lifeline
rates" would reduce the prices charged for retail customers consuming relatively small amounts of electricity.2 2
Although utility regulation issues have historically been resolved at the state level, the depth of public concern about rates
and energy policy led to major federal intervention in the form of
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA).2 3
The Act directs states to examine a variety of ratemaking issues
relating primarily to economic efficiency criteria such as marginal
cost pricing; lifeline rates, although not aimed at efficiency, are
also favored. As Joskow points out, "the consideration and adoption of the appropriate standards for ratemaking remains largely
up to the states, although there is the threat that states which do
not comply may find themselves faced with further federal initiatives in a few years."'24 The impact of new federal legislation on
the state regulatory process is discussed in Professor Jones' article.
In this area, it is important to note that the limited usefulness of
economic theory under noncompetitive conditions may blunt this
federal threat. A recent cautionary note was sounded by the Ontario Energy Board, which concluded that "economic efficiency
cannot be achieved through electricity rate structures."2 In the
Board's view, such an approach is a futile theoretical exercise as
applied to a single electric utility. This is particularly true "in an
energy sector that is an imperfect mix of public and private industry and investment with massive and continuing intrusion by government on pricing."26
Consumer pressures have been directed at three additional areas: managerial competence, alternative methods of selecting
PUC commissioners, and public ownership as an alternative to
privately-owned and managed electric utilities.
and peak users' rates should be correspondingly higher. In off-peak periods, marginal opportunity costs of consumption are relatively low. Id. at 89.
21. Peak prices, under these principles, would be higher and it is the ordinary consumer who is the chief peak user. Id. at 100-01 & n.41.
22. Joskow, supra note 2, at 793.
23. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 15, 16,
30, 42, 43, 47 U.S.C.).
24. Joskow, supra note 2, at 797.
25. Smart, Pages with the Editor, 105 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 5 (Feb. 28, 1980).
26. Id.
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In regard to managerial competence, it should first be noted
that PUC's have rather myopically focused on limiting utilities'
profits. PUC's could hardly be expected to serve as second-line
management; 27 yet this area may hold the key to lower costs. The
problem faced by PUC's is that no one knows the method or
methods which will produce at lowest cost since no one has perfect
knowledge of all available production or management techniques.
In addition, there are production and management innovations
which will lower costs but are as yet unknown. The best that can
be done here is to create movement toward more efficient production by motivating utility managers to collect and use the existing
information on production and management technique, and by
motivating managers to seek out innovation. If the present management cannot or will not do this, or is too incompetent from the
outset, then there must be a mechanism to replace it.
What conditions are needed to motivate or replace management and therefore facilitate movement toward efficiency? First,
since no one person or group knows a priori the most effective
method of production, there must exist a number of persons or
groups offering alternative methods of production. Second, to remove inefficient methods of production there must be a mechanism for elimination. This can be accomplished by what could be
called "natural selection," that is, the elimination of producers by
some independently operative constraint. For example, observe
that firms in a competitive market which cannot maintain a normal (or economic) profit eventually stop producing, whereas the
more efficient firms which do have normal profits can continue
production. This automatic elimination of unprofitable firms is an
example of natural selection. The elimination of inefficient producers can also be achieved by factors external to the market. For
example, elimination could be accomplished by some agency
which has evaluated the production process by using a performance indicator. It should be understood that the choice of performance indicator will have wide-ranging effects on the behavior
of management since management survival now depends on what
is being required. The choice of performance indicator should direct this behavior toward desired ends.
The third condition for facilitating efficient production is the
existence of some source for new input into the production
processes. Since innovation depends on new viewpoints, this vari27. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 29-31.
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ation must be achieved at least in part by the introduction of new
managements. There will also be variation in production
processes due to the remaining managements who are now faced
with the strong motivating force of survival of the fittest. When
new variations of production arise, the process of selection and
further variation should begin again.28
Of course PUC's have not attempted to impose these conditions on the electric utility industry, and have in fact shortsightedly focused on limiting profits while granting only passing
attention to the operating expenses and capital outlays which are
the most important component of rate levels. 29 Although detailed
transaction by transaction PUC review would accomplish nothing,30 the possibility exists that multiple regression analysis could
be used to isolate the effects of differences in managerial efficiency
on the production of electric power by electric utilities. 3 I The results of such comparison could serve as the performance indicator
mentioned earlier.
The incentive effects of any performance indicators, however,
are diluted, if not eliminated, by the fact that attempts to penalize
the inefficient firm by reducing its rate of return will simply cause
the price of its stock to fall, the interest rate on its bonds to rise,
and its cost of capital to increase. Thus, when PUC's reach into
the quiver of regulatory incentives, the only arrow to encourage
efficiency may be the phenomenon of regulatory lag. During the
period of time between one rate adjustment and the next, the utilits income and must bear the cost of any faility must live 3within
2
so.
do
ure to
The public has also recently begun to advocate the election,
rather than appointment of PUC commissioners. Most states currently use a system of gubernatorial appointment to the PUG; in
two states, appointments are made by the state legislature; and in
28. The importance of these elements in ensuring lowest cost production was pointed
out long ago by Adam Smith, who argued that efficient management "can never be universally established [except] in consequence of that free and universal competition which
forces everybody to have recourse to it for the sake of self defense." A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 147 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
29. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURES AND ECONOMIC PERFORM-

ANCE 527-28 (1970); 1 A.KXAN, supra note 6, at 29.
30. See 1 A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 29-30.
31. W. luLo, ELECTRIC UTILITIES-COST AND PERFORMANCE 4-8 (1962); J. SMITH,
THE MEASUREMENT OF ELECTRIC UTILITY EFFICIENCY 11-34 (1975).
32. T. MORGAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF Busi-

NESS 249 (1976).
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thirteen states, the offices are filled by direct election.33 Contrary
to popular notions, it appears that elected-and thus politically
accountable--commissioners do not necessarily accomplish more
effective control over skyrocketing rates. One political analyst
tested to determine the degree to which several regulatory attributes-the ratio of staff members to commissioners, the method of
commissioner selection, and commissioners' educational
level-affected the average regulated residential rate per kilowatt
hour for each state. Regarding methods of selecting commissioners, he concluded that
[i]n both residential and industrial markets and for each cross
section in time the elective mode of selection was associated
with higher utility rates. . . . The results clearly indicated that
this presumed institutional corrective against agency capture
and permissive regulation has had a perverse effect and has
shifted electric rates upward by substantial margins.3 4
Elected commissions thus apparently offer little solace to consumers desiring lower rates. Although this public bias toward election
of PUC commissioners is not supported by the data, the interest in
elected commissions suggests at least a growing lack of confidence
in present regulatory institutions.
The basic assumption underlying regulation of private utilities-that private incentives for wealth will induce more efficient
operation-are increasingly questionable. 35 The fact that private
ownership under regulation gives no assurance whatever of efficient production is gaining increasing public and investor attention. As a practical matter, under conditions of high inflation and
mushrooming environmental costs, it may be politically impossible to raise rates at a pace sufficient to provide an adequate rate of
return. These uncertainties are already causing investor hesitation.3 6
Public ownership of the industry is often discussed as a possi33. T. Pelsoci, The Energy Crisisand the New Breed of Regulators: A Case Study of
State Public Utility Commissions8 (1979) (unpublished, on file with the author of this foreword).
34. T. Peloci, Commission Attributes and Regulatory Discretion:.A Longitudinal Study
of State Public Commissions 22 (unpublished paper 1978).
35. Peltzman, Pricingin Public and Private Enterprises:Electric Utilities in the United
States, 14 J. oF LAW AND ECON. 109, 111-12 (1971).
36. See Lawless, supra note 5. The problems have not gone unnoticed on Wall Street.
Standard and Poor's Index of twenty-two electric utility stocks declined twelve percent
during 1978 (while the index of 500 stocks rose one percent). Dodosh, supra note 6, at 40,
col. 1.
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ble means of checking the upward spiral in electric rates. 37 This
country has had substantial experience with publicly-owned electric systems. Two thousand, two hundred and twenty three local
publicly-owned systems accounted for 10.3% of the total electric
operating revenues in 1978.38
Consumer-owners of the nation's local publicly owned electric
utilities continue to enjoy significantly lower electric rates than
consumers of private power ... In 1978, for example, the average residential consumer in a local public power system used
34.7% more electricity than the average residential customer of
the private power companies, but the public power consumer
paid 6.3% less on the average for his 34.7% greater annual consumption.3 9
Some scholars point out that the cheaper rates provided by publicly-owned utilities are illusory and attributable only to the
avoidance of taxes, especially property taxes, and the lower interest costs obtainable through the issuance of tax-exempt bonds.
The avoidance of property taxes and other local taxes is largely
fictitious, however, inasmuch as the government takeover simply results in a shift in the tax burden previously borne by the
utility (but collected from its customers through the rate
sched4
ules) directly to utility customers and other taxpayers. 0
The conclusion that the entire rate differential between publicly-owned and privately-owned utilities is attributable to trans4
fers of the tax burdens is, however, premature and untested. 1
Existing data suggests that
administrative and general expenses reported by public systems
were lower than private power companies on the basis of expense per $100 of revenue ($4.64 to $5.11) and on the basis of
kwh sold (1.13 mills per kwh for the publicly owned systems
compared to 1.79 mills per kwh for the private companies).4'
No theory has been advanced which adequately explains this
differential in managerial efficiency. This may be due to the fact
that, in contrast to the vast outpouring of literature on regulation
in the United States, little attention has been given to the issues of
control and efficiency of publicly-owned industry generally or
electric utilities in particular. The work that has been done is
37. See Richardson, On Government Takeovers of Investors-OwnedElectric Utilities,
98 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 19 (Nov. 4, 1976).

38. Electric Utility Statistics, 38 PUB. POWER D-2 (Jan.- Feb. 1980).
39. Public Power Costs Less, 38 PUB. POWER 36 (Jan.- Feb. 1980).
40. Richardson, supra note 37, at 25.
41. See, for example, Richardson's conclusory discussion of managerial accountability
in publicly-owned electric utilities. Id.
42. Public Power Costs Less, supra note 39, at 37.
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highly generalized and has resulted in superficial conclusions. 43
Since each type of industry in which government enterprise
might operate has a different set of applicable constraints, the in-

quiry into governance of public enterprise must focus on the specific practical problems of a particular industry and on the
an informulation of an optimal structure for that industry. Such
44
quiry has been attempted for the mass transit industry.
A similar industry-specific inquiry is necessary to analyze the
optimal governance scheme for publicly-owned electric power.
Public ownership in this industry may in fact present opportunities to satisfy the conditions for lowest cost production mentioned
earlier. 45 A publicly-owned utility may avoid the dilemma faced
by private owners whereby a reduction in the rate of return disrupts the utility's ability to attract needed capital. For example, it
may be possible to introduce competitive pressure by having contract management firms bid for the opportunity to manage the
utility system. The objective (and measure of performance) would
be to extend reliable service to all who seek it at the lowest cost
per kilowatt hour. The available plant and equipment should be
delineated. Complete data on the system's previous operations
43. For example, one analyst concludes her book by summarizing some criteria for
effective public enterprise:
First, there must be a popular and official acceptance of the enterprise as legitimate government activity to be conducted for explicitly public purposes. ....
Second, the financial policies of the enterprise should be integrated with the government's general financial policies and budget plans. . . . Third, there must be
strong leadership of elected officials and their executive officers. . . . Fourth, a
system must be devised to facilitate accommodations with other agencies and programs in related policy areas... . Fifth, adaptability to changing circumstances,
popular demands, and shifts in the policy priorities of elected administrations is
needed. . . . Sixth, the public and government must have access to information. . . . Seventh, management must be open to representative viewpoints from
society. . . . Eighth, strong and stable executive leadership and continuing emphasis on management improvement, performance controls, and administrative
decentralization are needed. Finally, there must be steady access to capital funds
at a pace and under conditions that reflect fiscal responsibility, careful financial
planning, and reasonable public control over burdens on the taxpayer.

A.

WALSH, THE PUBLIC'S BUSINESS: THE POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF GOVERNMENT

CORPORATIONS 343-46 (1978).
The reader will find it exceedingly difficult to make the above criteria operational. For
example, it would seem to be beyond the ken of an imperfect democratic system to create
mechanisms which guarantee a popular and official acceptance of the government enterprise (#1 above), or to guarantee strong leadership (#3 above) or to guarantee adaptability
(#5 above). It is difficult even to measure these desired outcomes, let alone create mechanisms which guarantee their existence.
44. See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE: A
CASE STUDY OF URBAN MASS TRANSIT (in the process of publication by D.C. Heath-

Lexington Books).
45. See text accompanying note 28, supra.
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should be available to all bidders. Contract management firms
could then make management proposals, including a budget, outlining what performance levels could be obtained with rate revenues. Proposals should recommend a rate structure for the
various services and customer groups. The contract management
fee, within defined reasonable limits, should be included as one of
the costs in the budget.46
The term of the management contract should be short. Long
term contracts could not be satisfactorily specific under conditions
of uncertainty as to future policy and investment objectives, costs,
and consumer demand.4 7 Two year contracts, for example, would
facilitate sequential decisionmaking. As Williamson points out,
"[t]he future is permitted to unfold and adaptations are introduced, at contract renewal dates, only to those events which actually materialize. . . . Sequential decisionmaking procedures
economize greatly on bounded rationality. ' 48 The responsibility
for long term investment planning must be borne by the utility's
governing board, by utilizing an independent outside planning
staff, or outside consultants.4 9
The board should first screen all proposals on the basis of the
already-established competence of the firms to accomplish the
task. The board would then select that proposal which committed
management to the highest levels of performance in terms of the
criteria set out in the bidding instructions. The contract would
provide for a base payment if all criteria were met within the
budget; relatively severe penalties should be assessed for failure to
stay within the budget. Scaled penalties should also be provided
for failure to meet performance criteria. If performance exceeds
the contractually agreed terms, scaled rewards should be granted.
A comprehensive review at the end of each contract period
would be necessary to determine whether the criteria, including
the budget constraints, had been satisfied. The review should be
focused on determining the degree of performance, not on secondguessing management decisions.
Any form of continuous review should be avoided. If the
46. Note that the higher the fee, the less funds available for programs to meet the
performance criteria.
47. See Williamson, FranchiseBiddingfor Natural Aonopolies-In Generaland With
Respect to CATV, 7 BELL J. OF ECON. & MOT. 78-79 (1976).
48. Id. at 83.
49. Crain & Ekelund, Chadwick andDemsetzx On CompetitionandRepulation,19 J. OF
LAW AND ECON. 149, 161 (1976).
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board required assurance during a contract period that management was performing adequately, the board could spot-check
whether performance criteria are being met in selected areas.5 0 If
error were clearly apparent, further inquiry could be made, and
the board should be empowered to terminate on short notice following a hearing.
The introduction of a bidding system for recurrent short term
management contracts has a number of attractive features, not the
least of which is the introduction of competitive pressures as a
spur to efficiency. Of course the incumbent has advantages of specialized knowledge, and perfect bidding parity at contract renewal
may not be attained,5 1 but these effects should be outweighed by
the survival threat created in the first instance by the necessity of
renewal.5 2
There are other advantageous features. This approach to business accountability is considerably simpler and more effective
than engaging in management audits and other conventional accountability measures. The board's attention is properly focused
on policies, operating objectives, and criteria. Once performance
criteria are set, the monitoring of management performance poses
relatively limited problems of data collection and interpretation.
Management is relieved from the burdens of generating a number
of reports. Inadequate managerial performance should also be
quickly apparent and could continue no longer than the duration
of a short term contract.
Finally, the effectiveness of the contracting process should improve over time. Each subsequent round of comprehensive review
and contract negotiations should provide feedback to assist in examining policies, objectives, and criteria.
Under the present scheme of private ownership under regulation, electric utilities are caught in the middle between the upper
and nether grindstones of higher operating costs and inflationary
erosion of revenues. These conditions are leading utilities to
"pancake" rate increase requests. For example, Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. received 60 million dollars in higher rates in
50. Conventional accountability could also benefit from spot-checking, rather than
continuous monitoring. Spot-checking tends to be directed at results of management decisions, and not the wisdom of the decisions themselves. See Drucker, The Real Duties of a
Director,Wall St. J., June 1, 1978, at 20, col. 3.
51. See Williamson, supra note 47, at 84.
52. See Roberts, An Evolutionary and Institutional View of the Behavior of Public and
Private Companies, 65 AM. ECON. REv. 415, 420 (1975).
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May, 1979, started hearings on an 80 million dollar request in
seek an addiApril, 1980, and said in the same month it would 53
year.
next
rates
higher
in
dollars
million
165
tional
Predicting the long run results of these trends is difficult, but if
the result is to bring into focus the failure of regulation to achieve
any assurance of operating efficiency, the result will be beneficial.
Alternatives may be explored, including the possibility that public
ownership could provide a vehicle to introduce conditions that
might better approximate those necessary for lowest cost production. Such a result would surely lead to greater public confidence
that rising utility prices are nonetheless as low as efficient production will permit. Thus, current consumer resentments and the
concomitantly expensive, delay-generating political pressures
might fade.
NEIL W. HAMILTON*

53. See Lawless, supra note 5; Diemer, RevisedPUCOStartsHearingson Rate Hike of
$80 Millionfor CE!, The Plain Dealer, Apr. 9, 1980, § B, at 8, col. 1.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University; B.A. (1967) Colorado College; J.D. (1970) University of Minnesota; M.A. (1979) University of Michigan.

